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Britain in the Seventies – Our
Unfinest Hour?
Les années 1970- le pire moment de l'histoire britannique?
Kenneth O. Morgan
1 In popular recollection, the 1970s have gone down as the dark ages, Britain’s gloomiest
period since the Second World War. It may be that the aftermath of the Brexit vote in
2016 will herald a period of even greater crisis, but for the moment the sombre seventies,
set between Harold Wilson’s ‘swinging sixties’ and Margaret Thatcher’s divisive eighties,
stand alone. They began with massive trade union stoppages against Heath’s Industrial
Relations  Act.  They  continued  with  the  financial  crisis  of  the  IMF  and  the  random
atrocities of  the Irish Republicans.  They ended with the ‘Winter of  Discontent’  when
unparalleled strikes, official and unofficial, revealed a country ‘as governable as Chile’ in
the populist view of one US politician, and reduced the Labour prime minister, James
Callaghan, himself an old trade union official, to a paralysis of despair. He felt, as he told
Ken Stowe, his private secretary (and later me) that he had ‘let the country down’. The
idea  of  ‘dark  ages’  is  indeed  literally  appropriate.  Recollections  of  the  seventies  are
coloured by memories of a public blackout, reminiscent of the second world war during
the blitz, without the compensating feeling of national heroism and historic endurance.
The earlier years of the decade featured not only many strikes by the engineers and
electrical workers, but Edward Heath’s catastrophic three-day week in response to the
miners’ strike of 1974 when London’s major thoroughfares were cast into darkness, shops
and restaurants were unlit and gloomy, public television services were suspended for
several nights a week, and suburban families ate their sombre dinners at home not very
romantically with the light of such spare candles as shopkeepers still had available. 
2 This  popular  gloom  was  echoed,  indeed  reinforced,  by  historians  and  political
commentators.  In  the  late  seventies,  there  was  a  flood  of  pessimistic  literature,
particularly from Americans, on the state of the nation – The Future that Doesn’t Work:
Social Democracy’s Failures in Britain (1977), The Politics of Economic Decline (1979), Britain:
Progress and Decline (1980), and, most evocative of all, Isaac Kramnick’s Is Britain Dying?
(1979). A serious academic account of the IMF crisis in late 1976 was entitled, somewhat
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absurdly, Goodbye Great Britain.1 Historians gave their books titles which heavily featured
words like ‘Decline’, ‘Downfall’ and ‘Eclipse’, seeing the roots of disaster perhaps as far
back as the 1870s,  perhaps even in Britain’s very existence as a self-contained island
country over the centuries. It seemed the bleakest time since the mass unemployment of
the inter-war years. Everything was going wrong. There was turmoil in industry and a
collapse of public services from schools to cemeteries, a growing mood of very un-British
violence from the IRA to football fans on the rampage to battered wives, there was ethnic
tension,  the  population  was  ageing  and  the  birth-rate  falling,  English  football  had
slumped since the World cup victory of 1966. Its male tennis players were near-useless,
and  its  cricketers  humiliated  by  the  Australians  and  the  West  Indians.  The  most
appropriate Latin tag for an unduly classically-educated people was sunt lacrimae rerum –
the Tears of Things. At another time of national gloom, therefore, forty years on, it is
appropriate for  the historian to examine how valid these depressing verdicts  on the
United  Kingdom really  were.  After  all,  variously  during  the  Thatcher  years  and  the
heyday  of  New  Labour  after  1997,  Britain  seemed  to  bounce  back  impressively  and
manifest a new self-confidence and buoyancy. The sick man of Europe became for some
years its social and economic front-runner, leaving France and even for a time Germany
trailing in its wake. Were the dark ages an exaggerated fabrication of excited journalists
and  ill-disposed  foreigners?  Or  did  the  seventies  uncover  something  fundamentally
wrong about this ancient people which survives to diminish its authority and restrict its
vision down to the present day? 
 
The Down Side
3 The negative aspects of Britain in the seventies, on which commentators focussed, were
essentially four. These were conflict and class war in industry, a sharp downturn in the
economy, a flight to extremism in political life, and a rise in public and domestic violence.
Without  doubt,  each  of  these  revealed  a  new  pattern  of  internal  vulnerability  not
experienced previously, and a marked contrast with the stable social democracy that the
United Kingdom had appeared to be since the second world war, both under Labour’s
welfare democracy under Attlee after 1945 and Wilson after 1964, and the thirteen years
of emollient ‘one-nation Toryism’ in between. Now there were new challenges to which a
post-imperial, once-great power seemed unable to respond. 
4 The  social  conflict  in  industry,  certainly,  was  on  a  scale  and  of  a  character  not
experienced since the days of the Triple Alliance, Black Friday and the General Strike
between 1919 and 1926. It is true that warning signs of future conflict had been evident in
the later sixties. The Donovan report of 1968 illustrated how the internal structures of
leadership in the unions had been changing in the sixties with power increasingly passing
to shop stewards like ‘Red Robbo’ (Derek Robinson) in Longbridge and Alan ‘the Mole’
Thornett in the Cowley car plant in Oxford during unofficial strikes. National collective
bargaining was becoming localised which gave militants on the shop floor more power.
Barbara Castle, backed by the prime minister, Harold Wilson, had tried to deal with this
by legislation but her 1969 Industrial Relations Bill was strongly opposed by the unions. It
met  with  its  nemesis  in  Cabinet,  the  main  opponent  being  no  less  than  the  Home
Secretary, Jim Callaghan. But the turmoil provoked by Heath’s 1971 Industrial Relations
Act was of a quite different order. It was a dangerous attempt to apply legal sanctions to
industrial relations which had been governed by voluntary collective bargaining since the
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1906 Trades Disputes Act, a policy which the Donovan report had previously supported.
The irony was that the unions had carefully observed the terms of the Act – and yet the
strikes went on. Furthermore, the trade unions were now primed for battle as never
before.  Their membership had been rising fast,  reaching a record 13,498,000 in 1979,
growing spectacularly amongst white- collar workers, with unions like NUPE and NALGO
recruiting  strongly  amongst  local  government  workers  and  amongst  groups  such  as
health service workers and schoolteachers.  The unions now had immensely powerful
national officials like Jack Jones, secretary of the mighty Transport and General Union,
with well over a million members. Frightened journalists wrote of ‘The Emperor Jones’
and of the ‘terrible twins’, Jones and his associate Hugh Scanlon of the Engineers. Heath’s
Industrial Relation Act of 1971 led to the largest trade union protests for two generations,
while a  hitherto unknown public  official  called the Official  Solicitor  was called in to
release  some  trade  officials,  the  so-called  ‘Pentonville  Five’,  from  gaol.  Worse  still
followed with two national coal miners’ strikes in 1972 and the beginning of 1974, the
first  such  since  1926.  They  were  solidly  backed  by  the  TUC’s  general  secretary,  Vic
Feather. The first led to a total surrender to the wage and bonus demands of the miners (a
surrender duly noted by the government’s Minister for Education, Margaret Thatcher).
The second in January 1974 led to a national state of emergency, the three-day week and
a general  election called by Heath on the theme ‘Who Governs Britain?’  The answer
appeared to be the unions since Heath was defeated and had to resign. 
5 The union troubles, however, continued to mount up alarmingly under Labour. Wilson
and Callaghan had concluded a so-called ‘social contract’ with the TUC under which the
unions would supposedly observe wage restraint while legislation sympathetic to their
wishes went through. The minister responsible for industrial relations was now Michael
Foot, an old left-winger determined to give way to the unions on virtually everything,
including the closed shop: he did, however, restore a measure of order to relations with
the unions more on the lines intended by the Act of 1906, the so-called Magna Carta of
Labour.2 But  strikes  continued,  many  of  them unofficial,  and  wage  claims  mounted,
driving the level of price inflation up to almost 30 per cent. All manner of workers were
now engaged including key groups not previously considered as a threat such as the
water workers. Some employers made matters far worse by an intransigent anti-union
attitude such as in the Grunwick photo-processing works in North London where the far-
right owner sacked a number of Asian women workers who were members of unions. This
led to daily violent confrontations between police and up to 20,000 workers outside the
Grunwick plant, and a new sense of class war between the unions en masse and right-
wing journalists and commentators. There was talk of private anti-union groups being
prepared for a coup armed by an eccentric extremist called Colonel Stirling, and General
Walker’s ‘non-party militia’. A sense of potential civil war loomed in England’s green but
no longer pleasant land. 
6 The worst of the class war came, ironically, under the premiership of James Callaghan,
the old trade union official who had led the opposition to Barbara Castle’s bill of 1969 in
Cabinet. Fanned by a background of lagging pay increases and reviving price inflation,
there erupted a massive series of industrial disputes that lasted from late October 1978 to
the spring of 1979. These were random, often quite unco-ordinated affairs. While many
workers could be classed as low-paid, many of the strikers, such as oil-tanker drivers and
power workers, were not and their actions added to the inflationary pressures on their
poorer  comrades.  There  were  large  unions  on strike  like  the  Transport  and General
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Workers (led now, not by Jack Jones who had retired, but by a weak former shop steward
called Moss Evans). But there was also a wide array of almost nihilistic local strikes which
impacted directly on the public. Striking dustmen meant that putrid rubbish bins were
not collected and emptied,  children were kept out of  school  by striking school  care-
takers, hospital wards were closed by striking health workers and patients died. In one
especially  notorious  episode,  Liverpool  grave-diggers  went  out  on  strike.  A  Cabinet
minister,  Harold  Lever,  gloomily  observed,  ‘Let  the  dead  bury  their  dead’.3 .The
government seemed paralysed by the extent of the strikes and stoppages. In January and
February 1979,  almost 30 million working days were lost,  more than three times the
whole of  the previous year.  On the worst  day,  22 January 1979,  1.5  m.  public  sector
workers did not turn up for work. Callaghan, slumped in anomie, could offer little other
than an almost meaningless ‘St. Valentine’s Day agreement in February. The government
failed to call a state of emergency which ministers like David Owen wanted. The strikes
went on, at a diminished pace, until the minority Callaghan government fell from power
at the general election in May. 
7 Of course, many commentators gave exaggerated, politically prejudiced, verdicts on the
Winter of Discontent. Not all workers were on strike all the time. Many of them were very
brief and unco-ordinated. Some of the wage claims, including by the miners, had much
justification at an inflationary period even if high wage settlements made that inflation
worse.  Many  were  provoked  by  insensitive  and  right-wing  employers  with  poor
management skills.  But it  would be absurd to deny that something very unusual and
alarming was taking place’ A total of 29,474,000 working days were lost in 1979, easily the
worst since 1943 (the next worse were also in the seventies, the second highest in 1972
with  23,909,000  and  the  third  1975  with  14,750,000).  In  all,  4,583,000  workers  were
involved in 1979 and there was a massive loss of production.4 The psyche of the country
was deeply shaken. Later, the unions, especially after their defeat in the 1984 – 5 miners’
strike, were to suffer a steep decline: their membership slumped from 13 million to just
over 5 million; their power has been gravely undermined by legislation; their allies in the
Labour Party were to be out of power for eighteen years. The unions had refused to move
away  from their  traditional,  adversarial,  ‘them and us’  class  attitudes.  Proposals  for
industrial co-determination contained in the 1976 Bullock report had failed because the
union leaders had no wish to become bosses under the capitalist economic order. The
resultant folk memories of ‘he enemy within’ were kept warm by Mrs. Thatcher. At the
Conservative conference she recalled the bad old days when the unions reflected the left-
wing dogma of a socialist government. ‘Do you remember the Labour Britain of 1979? It
was a Britain in which leaders held their members and our country to ransom.’5 The
unions’ behaviour had destroyed their role in a corporate Britain going back to Ernest
Bevin during the war. The ancien regime was over. 
8 Closely  intertwined with the  industrial  conflicts  of  the  seventies,  of  course,  was  the
decline of the economy. Despite repeated balance of payments problems and the forced
devaluation of  the pound in 1967,  the Labour government  of  the sixties  kept  things
reasonably stable. Employment was high; inflation under control. Economic historians
wrote of a ‘golden age’ of the economy which lasted from 1945 to 1973. However, the
Labour years had been one of frequent crisis, with frequent recourse to bailouts from the
US Treasury. The plan for four per cent a year economic growth had manifestly failed,
and the growth rate in 1964 – 70 had, if anything, been below that of the previous six
years  under  the  Tories.  The  new  department  supposed  to  promote  growth,  the
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Department of Economic Affairs under George Brown had been humiliatingly abolished.
From the early seventies, the dark clouds rolled in. 
9 The  old  nostrums,  those  of  Keynes  and  Beveridge,  which  had  governed  social  and
economic policy since the war under both major parties, now seemed no longer valid.
Increasingly,  economic  writers  suggested  that  Keynesianism,  with  its  expansionary
pump-priming economics and positive use of the deficit in finance, was proving out of
date. It paid insufficient attention to the global economy and to inflation (in fact,  an
inaccurate  account  of  Keynes’s  own  views).  For  many  decades,  following  Keynes,
governments had regarded a return of pre-war unemployment as the main danger to be
avoided.  Now  economists,  especially  in  the  United  States,  urged  that  inflation  not
unemployment was the major evil to be identified, and this should be checked through
strict controls of the money supply. This was the burden of a growing number within the
Conservative  Party,  attracted  by  the  monetarist  doctrines  of  the  Chicago  economist,
Milton  Friedman.  Particular  evangelists  for  this  viewpoint  were  the  maverick  right-
winger, Enoch Powell, and a more recent guru, Sir Keith Joseph, and it was also voiced by
a think tank like Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon’s Institute of Economic Affairs, deeply
committed to  the neoliberal  doctrines  of  the venerable  Austrian guru,  Friedrich von
Hayek.6 Nor was the critique of Keynesianism confined to Conservative ranks. Peter Jay,
son-in-law of the prime minister Jim Callaghan and son of a famous socialist theorist,
Douglas Jay, hammered out the same message as financial columnist of The Times. With
the  theoretical  basis  for  analysing  weaknesses  of  the  British  economy  discredited,
politicians found themselves in the unknown without a map and without a compass. 
10 Throughout  the  seventies  the  endemic  structural  problems  of  Britain’s  economic
performance plagued every government and provided painful experiences for working
citizens. The Heath government which took office in June 1970 had won the election on a
starkly  anti-state  manifesto,  designed  to  curb  central  planning  and to  stimulate  the
private sector with tax cuts and other measures. Long before it fell from power, it was
clear that its economic policies were a total failure. In addition to failing to secure a
prices and incomes agreement with the trade unions,  its Chancellor,  Anthony Barber
proved to be highly incompetent and his supposed ‘dash for growth’ was having precisely
the reverse effect and leading to a property boom and huge inflation. In addition, the
government had the misfortune to be in power at a time when the outcome of the Arab-
Israeli  war  of  1973  led  to  a  massive  oil  price  inflation  with  the  nation’s  balance  of
payments suffering badly. Heath, who had totally reversed the Selsdon Park programme
in office, was now replaced in 1975 as Tory leader, by Margaret Thatcher, a far more
committed supporter of monetarism with a particularly close relationship with Sir Keith
Joseph. But it was now Labour which had to bear the burden of economic decline. Denis
Healey,  Labour’s  powerful  Chancellor  from  March  1974  had  to  grapple  with  a  new
phenomenon that of ‘stagflation’ with inflation and unemployment both rising at the
same time.7 Inflationary cost-push pressures at home from aggressive unions made his
dilemma all  the  worse.  In  1975,  with  inflation approaching  30  per  cent,  his  policies
seemed about to collapse in ruins but he was rescued by Jack Jones who committed the
unions to a flat-rate wage increase of £6 a week – a proposal which, of course, was also
strongly egalitarian. 
11 But by the autumn of 1976 the British economy seemed at a critical point. Notable was the
fact that the Labour government was giving sops to monetarism itself. Healey began the
policy of privatizing public assets starting with Burmah Oil, and of applying cash limits
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and other monetary targets to public spending. More startling still, Callaghan shook the
1976 party conference by telling them that ‘you can no longer spend your way out a
recession’  in  a  passage  of  his  speech  written  by  his  son-in-law,  Peter  Jay.8 But  the
inexorable financial problems of the British state continued. There were runs on sterling
and  talk  of  a  further  devaluation.  Tense  discussions  were  now  conducted  with  the
International Monetary Fund about the kind of monetary package that would be socially
acceptable. Callaghan, who well recalled from his earlier career the downfall of Ramsay
MacDonald,  another  Labour  prime  minister  who  was  forced  to  talk  to  international
bankers in 1931, kept his Cabinet in continuous session on a collective basis. In the end,
he managed to get his way, just, against both Keynesian expansionists like Crosland on
the right, and left-wing anti-capitalists like Tony Benn on the left. In the end, the IMF
granted  the  government  $3.9  billion  credit  as  against  a  $2.5  billion  cut  in  domestic
expenditure. For the next eighteen months, the government did much better. Douglas Jay
wrote  that  it  was  a  rare  administration  that  sharply  reduced  inflation  and  cut
unemployment at one and the same time, a rare double achievement.9 But in the end the
pressures of the ‘winter of discontent’ were overturning the government’s policies once
again, and when Callaghan left office in May 1979 the economic warning signs were all
too visible. Britain’s standing as the sick man of Europe seemed all too clearly confirmed. 
12 There  can  scarcely  be  any  argument  that  Britain’s  economic  standing  was  severely
weakened through the seventies, by global issues of inflation, and by industrial disorder
at  home.  The  country  suffered  and  governments  were  hapless  victims.  The  partial
recovery in 1977 – 8 suggests that there was still resilience. One fortuitous salvation was
floating the pound, that is, the ending of fixed exchange rates, surviving from the 1944
Bretton Woods agreement, in 1972. While this ate into the exchange value of the pound, it
means that it was no longer a reserve currency and the reserves less buffeted about by
global pressures. More practical and visible was the fact that in later seventies, oil from
the North Sea was starting to come through after 1975 to the immense benefit of both the
balance  of  payments  and  inflationary  pressures.  Europe’s  sick  man seemed likely  to
become as oil rich as countries in the Middle East, perhaps even to enter OPEC. But this
would  only  really  assist  the  economy  if  the  gains  were  devoted  to  investment  and
modernization, and British internal economic relations were to become less disorderly.
As Margaret Thatcher entered 10 Downing Street in May 1979, somewhat vacuously citing
blessings from St. Francis of Assisi, this all seemed a long way off. 
13 Another alarming feature of British experience in the seventies was the polarization of
its politics. Since the second world war, despite the harshness of party disputes, there
was relatively consensual aspects to political life. At times, there was talk of a possible
coalition government under someone like Callaghan. In the fifties, the journals invented a
composite figure, ‘Mr. Butskell’, part Mr. Butler, a one-nation Tory, part Mr. Gaitskell, a
Labour centrist.10 Even in the sixties, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath did not seem that
far apart. The mixed economy, the welfare state, full employment, decolonization in the
old  empire,  collaboration with  the  US  in  overseas  affairs  but  steadfast  resistance  to
involvement in war, as in Vietnam, were common to all the major parties. Europe was a
divisive issue, but the Conservatives got the country into the Common Market in 1973 and
Labour  confirmed  it  through  the  new  device  of  a  referendum  in  1975.  The  tiny
Communist party faded away while British fascism had little substance in the first place. 
14 In  the  seventies,  it  all  changed  and  turned  very  sour.  In  both  the  Labour  and  the
Conservative  parties  there  were  sharp  moves  to  the  extremes.  Worryingly  for  both
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parties, two-party politics in which the big parties aggregated up to 90 of the vote for
themselves, was giving way to a more fluid system in which the Liberal Party showed a
brisk revival under Jeremy Thorpe, challenges threatened the Labour ascendancy in both
Scotland and Wales  from the nationalist  parties,  and individual  revolts  against  their
party’s leaders were more numerous, as with Dick Taverne in the Labour Party in Lincoln
and Enoch Powell in the Conservatives who migrated to North Down in Ulster. British
politics seemed pluralist, almost unrecognisable.
15 Amongst  the Conservatives,  the  major  transformation was  that  the ‘peasants’  revolt’
identified with Margaret Thatcher when Heath fell as party leader, pushed the party away
from  One-Nation  traditions  to  the  neoliberal,  free-market  right.  The  main  leaders
throughout  the  seventies  –  men like  Carrington,  Whitelaw,  Pym,  Prior,  Gilmour  and
Walker – were still recognisably of the centrist tradition and not far removed from their
Labour opposites. But pressures in the party were moving against them. A particularly
influential figure was Sir Keith Joseph whose well-publicised opinions became a focus for
strongly  anti-statist  views  on  the  economy  and  suspicion  of  colonial  and  other
immigration  in  social  policy.  Margaret  Thatcher  was  a  vehement  disciple  of  the
monetarist, neoliberal doctrines of Hayek. She became a prominent member of a new
right-wing  think-tank,  the  Centre  for  Policy  Studies:  its  leading  figure,  the  sternly
monetarist  Sir  Alfred  Sherman  became  an  important  adviser.  These  new-style
Conservatives more than carried the fight to the socialist enemy.11 They recruited from
them, too. Former Labour ministers like Reg Prentice and Lord Chalfont, an eloquent
younger Labour ex-MP, Brian Walden, all subscribed to the vibrant new creed. They were
not yet dominant. When Mrs. Thatcher started her premiership in May 1979 the great
bulk of her Cabinet were moderate One-Nation Tories of the old school, following the
path of party leaders from Butler to Heath. By the end of 1981, the great bulk of them had
gone and the assault on Keynesian economics was being pursued apace. The neoliberals
had taken over the ship. It was entryism on the grandest and most audacious scale.
16 In the Labour Party, entryism of a quite different kind was under way. The disillusion
with Labour policies, including the failure of planning, had generated major changes in
the  party  in  the  years  of  opposition  between  1970  and  1974.  The  evasions  and
compromises of Wilson’s leadership had generated widespread discontent both in the
constituency  parties  and  the  trade  unions.  The  grass-roots,  discontented  with  a
complacent, inbred party apparatus in many of Labour’s heartland constituencies, moved
sharply to the left. They found their inspiration in Tony Benn, a centrist, pro-Europe, pro-
NATO Minister of Technology under Wilson, who now became the voice of socialist revolt
and  a  charismatic  figure  for  the  rank  and  file.  By  1972  his  outlook  had  changed
completely. Allied to far-left colleagues like Eric Heffer and the veteran Ian Mikardo, he
was an articulate, dangerously charismatic leader of the constituency far left.  He was
notably unfussy about his political allies, who included key leaders, Trotskyist or even
Stalinist,  later  prominent  in the Militant  Tendency,  directing their  fire  against  what
seemed to be the tired old party leadership. One of them, in Haringey in North London,
was the future leader of  the party forty years on,  Jeremy Corbyn.  They elaborated a
programme that rejected almost every major part of Labour’s programme. They wanted
higher taxation,  extensive further nationalization,  the imposition of  central  planning
agreements on private industry with private co-operatives in specific plants, unilateral
nuclear disarmament, ‘troops out’ in Northern Ireland, and the no British membership of
the European Common Market. Meetings of the party conference, even more of the party
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executive, became divisive and highly contentious, especially when left-wing officials like
the party secretary Ron Hayward were appointed. In the later seventies, with a violent
upsurge in the constituencies, encouraged by Benn, hostile to any anti-inflation policies
or dealings with the IMF, party conferences became a nightmare. With their demand for
an enclosed siege economy at home, and a ‘socialist foreign policy’ overseas, the Labour
Party rank and file, like Stalin, was pursuing socialism in one country. 
17 More dangerous were the mass trade- union leftists who turned to radical political action,
stirred by  the  industrial  revolt  against  wage  restraint.  Union power  made  itself  felt
throughout the party. No longer, as in the old days of leaders like Arthur Deakin of the
Transport Workers were the unions loyal and docile followers of the ‘labour alliance’ with
the political party. Many of their leaders were on the far left willing to ignore the usually
more  moderate  views  of  the  rank  and  file,  as  with  Alan  Fisher,  secretary  of  NUPE,
strongly entrenched in local government, or Ray Buckton of the engine drivers’ union,
ASLEF. A rising young militant in the Miners’ union Arthur Scargill of the Yorkshire men,
famous for his flying pickets and ‘the battle of Saltley Gates’ during the 1972 national
strike, was effectively a Communist. Many of them, like Moss Evans of the TGWU seemed
to have little understanding of political processes at all, and, despite the ‘social contract’
concluded with the Labour Party in 1973, little concern for how their actions might affect
the future election of a Labour government. It was the world of industrial relations, or
rather industrial confrontation, that interested them. As the old Yorkshire leader Ben
Smith, had once observed, ‘On t’ field, that’s t’ place’. Allied to the Bennites and Militants
in the constituents, they were pushing the party to a place far to the left of the Bevanites
in the fifties. After all,  Bevan’s followers claimed to be extra-parliamentary. The new,
hard left was enthusiastically anti-parliamentary.
18 With the Tories sliding to the neo-liberal right and the Labour rank and file pushing
towards the Marxist hard left, many worried about the political culture of their country.
The old landmarks of post-war Britain seemed to be disappearing. Concern was most
memorably  expressed  by  Roy  Jenkins,  now president  of  the  European  Union,  in  his
Richard Dimbleby radio lecture of 1979. He quoted W.B Yeats’s famous poem on the 1916
Easter Rising in Dublin. ‘The Centre cannot hold. The best lack all conviction and the
worst are full of passionate intensity’. It was a despairing cry from the most important
voice of civilised moderation. It was in two years’ time to lead to a major split in the
Labour Party and the founding of the Social Democratic Party, headed by Jenkins himself.
It  echoed  the  gloomy  message  of  Sir  Nicholas  Henderson  when  he  moved  to  the
Washington embassy in June 1979. He had commented how the great international power
of 1945 had shrunk in power and authority, with economic weakness abroad and social
division at home. He linked this to Britain’s long failure to involve itself in Europe.12 After
the May 1979 general election, many observers wondered whether some kind of centrist
government  of  national  unity  would  emerge  in  a  political  world  dominated  by
Thatcherites on the right and Bennites on the left. The Centre holding became a major
theme after the gloomy events of the seventies.
19 Finally, it seemed not only to be time of industrial conflict, economic decline and political
extremism, but a period of violence. In many areas, Britain, a peaceful, stable country
which had not known serious internal conflict since the civil wars of the seventeenth
century, seemed to be emerging in a harsh, even brutal, light. The most visible indication
of this came with terrifying events in Northern Ireland. After the relative optimism felt
about the civil rights movement in 1969 – 70, when Callaghan handled Ulster at the Home
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Office, the advent of the Conservatives, with Reginald Maudling now dealing with the
province, saw things go rapidly go downhill. A relaxed easy-going man in manner (with
suspect relations with the business world), he reacted to the increasingly alarming events
in  Northern  Ireland  with  remarkable  severity.13 After  the  conciliatory,  constructive
policies  in  Northern  Ireland  pursued  by  Callaghan  under  the  Labour  government,
Maudling resorted to internment without trial, to trying suspected terrorists in the jury-
less Diplock courts, and to harsh conditions for those in custody in Long Kesh prison. The
worst of all came on 30 January 1972, ‘Bloody Sunday’ in popular recollection, when the
Parachute Regiment opened fire on Catholic civil rights demonstrators on the streets of
Londonderry, and 13 civilians were killed. A young Nationalist MP, Bernadette Devlin ran
up to Maudling in the Commons chamber, slapped his face and called him ‘a murderous
hypocrite’. It took over 40 years for the course of events finally to be condemned when
the Saville inquiry revealed the full horrors, during David Cameron’s premiership, but the
effect  on Northern Ireland was  appalling.  Both the  Protestant  majority  and Catholic
nationalists moved to the extremes. Amongst the Ulster Unionists, leadership passed to
the Democratic Unionists headed by a ferociously anti-Catholic demagogue, the Revd. Ian
Paisley, challenging the moderate reformist premier, Brian Faulkner, at every turn. On
the  Nationalist  side,  the  initiative  was  seized not  by  the  constitutional  SDLP but  by
Provisional Sinn Fein, intimately linked to the violent men of the IRA. Heath had to wind
up  the  Northern  Irish  government  at  Stormont  and  to  impose  direct  rule  from
Westminster. 
20 The  consequences  both  in  Northern  Ireland  and  parts  of  mainland  Britain  were
horrifying.  There  was  a  rising  tide  of  violence,  assassinations,  bombings  and  casual
shootings, over the next few years. Relations between the occupying British army and the
resident Nationalists amounted to a state of war. Parts of Belfast, like the Catholic Falls
Road and the Creggan estate, became almost ungovernable. A power-sharing agreement
concluded at Sunningdale in December 1973 was soon made redundant. When Labour
returned to government at Westminster, it found itself immediately confronted in May
1974  by  a  general  strike  called  by  the  Ulster  Workers’  Council.  With  broad  support
amongst  Ulster’s  Protestants,  Wilson’s  government  had  simply  to  surrender.  Violent
events  now  multiplied  in  Britain  itself,  with  the  atrocious  murders  of  civilians  in
Birmingham,  Guildford  and  other  places,  Years  after  these  horrors,  Irish  anger  was
inflamed by evidence of police irregularities in the trials and of wrongful arrests which
took years to reverse. Another tragedy was the murder of the right-wing commentator,
Ross McWhirter, a strong critic of the IRA, at his home. Queasy American tourists refused
to visit London as the city was deemed unsafe; Londoners, hardened by old memories of
the blitz, were more resilient. In the final two years of the Labour government, 1977 – 79,
the experience of Northern Ireland was desolate. The Secretary for Northern Ireland now
was the Yorkshire miner, Ropy Mason, a strong partisan of the Unionist cause, while
relations  with  the  Republic  of  Ireland  rapidly  deteriorated  during  its  Fianna  Fail
government under Jack Lynch, the old party of Eamonn de Valera. There was no advance
on any front now. To many in Britain, these horrifying events in Northern Ireland were
the product of an alien society, so different from the tranquil continuities of mainland
Britain. But they could not fail to leave their legacy of violence there too. Apart from the
atrocities occurring on a regular pattern on the streets of English towns and cities, they
served  to  make  the  United  Kingdom  a  more  authoritarian  country,  with  the  police
retaining files  of  policies  on the harsh extra-legal  treatment  of  dissenters,  including
detention without trial and the more general threats to civil liberties later to be revived
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under the Counter-Terrorist  measures passed after 2000.14 The harassment of Muslim
minorities then was an action replay of strategies adopted against Irish suspects decades
before. It was all very incongruous in the land which treasured memories of Magna Carta
and he rule of law. 
21 It chimed in too with other manifestations of violent behaviour in British life, public and
private, unfamiliar if not unknown before. There were still racial tensions in areas with
black communities from the Commonwealth which were to explode in riots and conflict
with the police in Liverpool,  Tottenham and other places in the eighties.  The Wilson
government responded constructively with the Race Relations Board being set up in 1976
while  a  think-tank,  the  Runnymede  Trusts  monitored  acts  of  discrimination  against
coloured ethnic minorities in the law courts and the workplace, but tension remained.
Football  supporters  had  become  increasingly  aggressive  since  England’s  World  Cup
victory in 1966, and mob violence and gang warfare were a regular feature of town life on
Saturday afternoons, terrifying for ordinary citizens who lived in the neighbourhood.
Traditional local derbies such as Liverpool and Everton in Liverpool and the religious
prejudices behind Rangers and Celtic  ‘Old Firm’  clashes in Glasgow were particularly
frightening.  The  English  were  frightening visitors  in  other  countries  too  when their
teams played away. It was with much relief that continental Europeans noted that the
defeat of England by Poland kept them out of the 1974 World Cup finals. Nor was life
necessarily safer behind the closed doors of home. The police recorded a rising toll of
cases of domestic violence – 89,599 in 1974 alone - including a growing tally of rape and
wife-battering cases. Women’s Refuges were set up in many cities for protection, while
Victim Support (a voluntary movement of sympathizers) provided psychological comfort.
Britain seemed a more uncomfortable place in which to live a normal life. People looked
back nostalgically to the comforting stereotypes of the neighbourliness and warmth of
the People’s War when the communal patriotic ‘Dunkirk Spirit’ had seemed to prevail.
One profession that suffered unduly in this abrasive new atmosphere, was the police. The
old image of the friendly village constable,  the ‘Bobby on the beat’  celebrated in the
television series ‘Dixon of Dock Green’ (and used with political success by Jim Callaghan
as  parliamentary  spokesman for  the  Police  Federation)  was  giving  way,  not  only  in
Northern  Ireland,  to  a  far  more  abrasive  relationship  between  police  and  public.
Academics called the 1970s ‘the golden age of Criminology’.15 It was a dubious accolade.
 
The Renewal
22 This gloomy saga of conflict, decline and aggression would appear to have made Britain
ripe for major social confrontation on the lines of Les Evenements in France in 1968. Yet in
fact it did not happen and many of the consequences were benign. Even with the sharp
political  confrontations generated in the Thatcher regime in the eighties,  the United
Kingdom survived and in the later nineties appeared to prosper. A major factor was that,
contrary to Roy Jenkins’ pessimistic forebodings, the centre broadly did hold and the
fabric of society held secure, just about and with disturbing crises such as the year-long
miners’ crisis of 1984 – 5. It could certainly be said that the reports from the economic
messengers were too gloomy. Thus, after the IMF crisis talks in the autumn of 1976 it
emerged that the Treasury forecasts about the balance of payments and the Public Sector
Borrowing Requirement (£8.5 bn. In 1976 – 7 not the £10.5 bn. forecast) were seriously
wrong and offered a  highly distorted account  of  the state  of  the country’s  finances.
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Britain was to eliminate its current account deficit in 1977 (Sod-off Day Denis Healey
called it)  before  the  IMF loan even took effect.16 The  middle  years  of  the  Callaghan
government in 1977 – 8, when the pound recovered and the balance of trade became
stronger,  proved a  portent  of  happier  tidings ahead,  if  only industrial  conflict  could
somehow  be  prevented.  Consumer  affluence  generally  improved  as  shown  by  the
purchase of consumer goods such as cars and the rapidly growing number of holidays
spent on continental Europe. Without lapsing into the frivolity of the so-called ‘swinging
sixties’ and ‘permissiveness’ of the sixties, much of the population seemed reasonably
content  with their  lot.  In the world of  culture and the arts,  in its  films,  drama and
searching television documentaries like ‘Kathy Come Home’, Britain seemed as creative as
ever.  It  retained its dominance in pop music and popular fashion.  In the Sixties and
Seventies, British groups won the Eurovision song contest. The Beatles and the Rolling
Stones still  captivated the young all  over the world,  even if  the most celebrated pop
group in seventies Britain were the Swedish group Abba – though even they won fame
with victory with the imperishable lyrics of ‘Waterloo’ at the song contest in Brighton in
1974. 
23 Britain still scored heavily in the world of soft power. The decade was a flourishing one
for Britain’s universities, still benefiting from the stimulus of the Robbins report in the
previous  decade,  with  a  much  larger  cohort  of  young  people  (women  especially)
attending higher education, newer universities such as York, Warwick and Sussex making
impressive  progress  and  many  brilliant  achievements  for  British  scientific  research
groups. Further, university education was still totally free, with substantial maintenance
grants to support less affluent students. For more mature or part-time students, the Open
University,  that  brilliantly  innovative  experiment  in  distance  learning  set  up  under
Harold Wilson’s administration mainly by Jennie Lee, Nye Bevan’s widow,17 entered upon
a glorious  period.  Those  who took part  in  lecturing to  its  summer schools  (like  the
present  writer)  found  it  an  inspirational  experience.  Lifelong  learning  for  many
housewives and others was indeed now a reality. 
24 It was not only a decade with greater opportunity but with enough of the old welfare
egalitarianism to nullify the injustices of Britain’s deeply ingrained class system. One of
the striking features of the seventies is that it marked a peak in egalitarianism before
things fell away under the social injustices of the Thatcher era. The obscene contrast in
the eighties of young men sleeping rough overnight in the malls and shop doorways of
London while mindless ‘yuppies’ in business cashed in on the lower taxes, deregulation
and hedonism symbolised by the ‘Big Bang’ on London’s stock exchange in 1986, was not
evident in the seventies. A notable document was the report of the Diamond Commission,
The  Royal  Commission  on  the  Distribution  of  Income  and  Wealth  in  Britain,  whose
findings  appeared  between  1975  and  1979.  It  benefited  from  the  membership  of
distinguished progressive economists like Sir Henry Phelps Brown and Richard Layard.
The result was to show that the share of the before-tax distribution of the wealth of the
top 10% had fallen from nearly 30% in 1959 to 26.6 %. By contrast the 20% of the poorest
households which had claimed only 0.9 of the ‘original income’ rose through welfare
benefits and other supplementary assistance to a ‘final income’ share of 9.0%.18 The value
of  the  ‘social  wage’  was  underlined  for  those  whose  earning  capacity  had  suffered
through  illness,  injury  or  unemployment.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the
consequence  of  taxes  and  social  benefits had  achieved  ‘a  substantial  redistribution
towards  equality’.  Decades  later  the  authors  of  The  Spirit  Level would  point  to  the
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seventies as a rare time when Britain moved towards becoming a fairer, more socially just
society.19 It never happened again.
25 A major reason why these positive developments occurred was because of some at least of
the political leaders that this allegedly declining old regime threw up. Heath, a difficult
lonely personality, had the vision and idealism, to get his reluctant insular nation to enter
the  European  Economic  Community,  a  major  transformation  of  our  history.  He  also
brought  a  more liberal  perspective to the problems of  Northern Ireland.  Wilson and
Callaghan look much stronger in retrospect by comparison with what followed, as does
their intellectually and physically tough Chancellor, Denis Healey. The Oxford historian
Ross  McKibbin wrote  a  famous article  in  The  London Review of  Books in  1991 entitled
‘Homage to  Wilson and Callaghan’  along these  lines.20 The industrial  troubles  of  the
seventies would have taken a far more violent turn had Britain been under the abrasive
leadership of Margaret Thatcher and the economy functioned less well. Wilson was not a
healthy man when he became prime minister again in March 1974 and there was fear of
Alzheimer’s. He did not anticipate his victory and apparently was disappointed when it
came. But his ‘social contract’ had some tranquillizing effects while his confirmation of
Britain’s membership of the European community through a referendum was in its way a
triumph as great as Heath’s. He certainly handled that episode with far more skill and
aplomb than David Cameron in his ill-fated campaign in June 2016. Callaghan, a calm,
moderate  man  who  comfortably  dominated  the  new  opposition  leader,  Margaret
Thatcher, in 1976 – 9 and ended his premiership more popular than when he began (a
very rare achievement)  commanded national  confidence,  and,  until  a  series  of  major
tactical blunders in his final months (‘Crisis, what crisis?’) showed much tactical skill in
conducing operations. He handled a Cabinet of prima donnas (including the perfidious
Tony Benn) most adroitly, he took important new initiatives in domestic policy especially
on the issue of  standards in state education,  and won international  prestige through
acting as an effective honest broker between the US president Jimmy Carter, and the
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The 1978 Camp David Agreement that he negotiated
for Carter between President Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel in 1978 was a
remarkable diplomatic achievement.21 Callaghan could also move on in his judgements of
events. Long a fairly Eurosceptic politician, he became an important European figure,
helped  by  his  personal  friendships  with  Schmidt  and  the  French  president  Giscard
d’Estaing.  Towards the end of his premiership he was interested in Britain’s possible
involvement in the European Rate Mechanism. Callaghan and Harold Wilson helped to
keep Britain an orderly country whose institutions did not cave in and whose social fabric
remained relatively stable. As in the old wartime slogan, it was ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’.
26 It should also be said that some aspects of challenge in the seventies were portents of
future progress for this country. This particularly applies to women two themes that
occasioned much debate at the time – feminism and Celtic nationalism. British women
had  not  moved  on  from  their  traditional  unambitious  role  earlier  on,  despite  the
flamboyance of the ‘swinging sixties’. Young women remained fairly conventional in their
social  and moral  attitudes (including pre-marital  sex),  despite the frisson  they caused
amongst young men with their miniskirts and absorption in pop culture. The seventies
was different. Works such as Germaine Greer’s Female Eunuch (1970) and the publishing
house ‘Virago’ opened up new world of female self-expression and a more critical attitude
to the traditional  limited horizons  bred in  young British females  almost  from birth.
Journalists like Jill Tweedie and others on the Guardian’s Women’s Page became apostles
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of a more adventurous, rebellious way of life.  A major stimulus was the extension of
higher education with women entering universities and colleges in far greater numbers,
indeed  coming  in  time  to  provide  a  majority  of  Britain’s  students.  All  Oxford  and
Cambridge’s colleges would now admit women. It would take a long time for glass and
other ceilings to be destroyed in women’s access to major posts in business and the
professions, but progress was made in the seventies. Labour governments also helped
with the 1970 Equal Pay Act, and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. On a more sombre
note,  the  Domestic  Violence  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  of  1976  gave  women
greater protection against violent husbands or partners. Here the tension and challenge
of the seventies was clearly the result of progressive, egalitarian change which removed,
at least in part, the shackles, professional and personal, which had for so long blighted
women’s lives. Divorce went up but so did opportunity.
27 Celtic nationalism was another novelty with major implications for the future. In the
later sixties, the Scottish Nationalist Party and the Welsh nationalist Plaid Cymru (mainly
through the Welsh-language movement) as significant political factors for the first time,
but they had made little progress in the 1970 general  election against  the dominant
Labour Party.22 The issue of Celtic nationalism or devolution then made a major advance
with  the  1973  Kilbrandon  Commission’s  report  which  called  for  an  elected  Scottish
parliament with primary legislative powers and an elected Welsh Assembly with only
executive powers. The Labour government’s minority position in the Commons meant
that it was forced to proceed with schemes for Scottish and Welsh devolution from 1976
onwards, at first in a combined bill  then in two separate measures.  They were taken
through the Commons by Michael Foot, an old Bevanite centralizer now converted to
devolution  in  his  late  years.  The  English  majority  of  Labour  MPs  remained  either
apathetic or openly hostile.  In the end,  referendums were held in both Scotland and
Wales on 1 March 1979. Wales with no tradition of unified citizenship and long bound up
with England, had little passion for devolution then and it was defeated by a vote of
around four to one. In Scotland devolution was passed but with an insufficient majority of
electors  backing  it.  But  it  was  a  major  portent  for  the  future,  even  so.  Devolution
remained on the political agenda during the years of inflexible Unionism of Mrs. Thatcher
that followed. In 1999 both Scottish devolution (by large majority) and Welsh devolution
(by a tiny margin) had gone through and new legislatures were set up in Edinburgh and
Cardiff.
28 The implications  of  this  were  controversial.  Many feared that  piecemeal devolutions
would unravel the historic Union of the United Kingdom, and fears multiplied with the
progress  of  the  SNP  from  2007  onwards  which  led  to  a  referendum  on  Scottish
independence which failed. A federal state at least seemed possible. But it was clear, too,
that in both Scotland and Wales devolution had a liberating, democratizing effect.  In
Scotland, it inspired a sense of dynamism in civil society, combined with a positive view
on immigration and union with Europe. In Wales, the culture and language flourished,
though the economy did not. The blonde Welsh-speaking soubrette, Cerys Matthews of
Catatonia, sang that ‘every morning I wake up and thank the Lord I’m Welsh’. On balance
the growth of Celtic nationalism, like feminism, looks like a positive portent of change
that invigorated marginalised parts of the United Kingdom, making it less centralised and
simply less dominated by England. In 2016 it was a saga yet unfinished. 
29 But the area in which seventies Britain showed the most dynamic advance – albeit one
that evokes some regretful nostalgia after the Brexit referendum in June 2016, was in
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relation to Europe. This was truly a historic and fundamental change. The US Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk had famously observed in 1960 that Britain had lost an empire but was
still seeking a role. That was still true in 1970 with two British applications to join the EEC
rebuffed by President de Gaulle, the Commonwealth manifestly less central to Britain’s
needs,  and  Heath,  the  new prime minister,  far  less  concerned  with  building  up  the
‘special relationship’,  so-called, with the United States.  Heath introduced a quite new
momentum. He was an enthusiastic European, coming from Kent close to France and with
powerful memories of service in the war, and the years of peace that resulted. He began
serious  talks  about  access  to  Europe  and  its  common market  in  1971.  This  time  he
confronted not the stern resistance of  President de Gaulle,  but  a far  more emollient
French president, Georges Pompidou. They had a major breakthrough meeting in Paris on
20  –  21  May  1971,  which  survived  even Heath’s  dreadful  French.  There  were  tricky
discussions about food imports from Commonwealth countries,  the common fisheries
policy and British budgetary contributions to sustain the Common Agricultural Plan to
help French and German farmers. The underlying Monnet-inspired idea of ‘ever closer
union’ politically was wisely pushed off centre-stage. In October 1972, the deed was done
when the Commons agreed to entry with a majority of 112. Nearly all the Conservatives,
save for a few die-hards like Enoch Powell, supported it, as did the great mass of business
and the newspapers. Labour was deeply riven, but 67 Labour MPs, headed by Roy Jenkins
and also including other prominent figures like John Smith and Cledwyn Hughes voted
with the government,  while another 20 abstained. On 1 January 1973, British became
officially Europeans, even if with only modified rapture. Heath presented it as the answer
to Britain’s endemic economic problems, but many others remained sceptics. 
30 The real problems of reconciling the British with Europe, the land mass only twenty miles
away from Beachy Head,  came in 1974 when Labour and Harold Wilson returned to
power. The party had been disunited at the time of Heath’s negotiations and indeed had
officially voted against British membership in 1972. There were many on the left who saw
it  as  a  free-market  capitalist  club  whose  financial  policies  were  incompatible  with
democratic  socialism.  Many too,  from Enoch Powell  on  the  right  to  Tony Benn and
Michael Foot on the left saw European membership as an invasion of British sovereignty,
the supremacy of parliament and the primacy of the British common law. Wilson, who
was agnostic on the whole European question but desperate to preserve party unity on
the matter, determined the final strategy. This was to call for the first time a nationwide
referendum on membership of Europe,  preceded by a purported renegotiation of the
terms  agreed,  with  Cabinet  ministers  free  to  campaign  on  either  side  of  the  issue.
Callaghan’s deft hands were used for the renegotiation. While most of the new decisions
were  little  more  than cosmetic,  he  was  able  to claim achievements  over  the  British
contributions to the European budget and the admission of Commonwealth products like
Canadian and Australian meat  and New Zealand butter,  in a  very unsentimental  but
business-like way. No Gaitskellite rhetoric about the Dardanelles and Vimy Ridge here,
nor  Callaghanite  emphasis  on  ‘the  language  of  Chaucer  and  Milton’.  The  European
negotiators  agreed  to  phase  down  contributions  for  countries  suffering  temporary
balance  of  payments  problems.  A  regional  fund  was  also  set  up  to  assist  areas  like
Callaghan’s  own  Wales.  The  referendum  campaign  and  was  tranquil  and  free  from
bitterness in the main. There was much financial support from pro-Europe banks and
business groups. Unlike 2016, there was cross-party collaboration in the campaign, with
Heath and Jenkins cheerfully sharing platforms, and Foot speaking alongside his friend
Enoch Powell. 
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31 With a background of solid support, membership of Europe easily went through. It was a
two to one majority, with around 17 million voting for membership and around 8 million
against. The voters accepted the result with equanimity – after all the European world
was  far  more  familiar  now  with  millions  of  British  people  taking  holidays  on  the
continent, notably France, Italy and ex-Franco Spain. Young people, especially students,
were growing up in a multi-cultural world, enjoying claret and cappuccino and riding
Lambrettas, with European fashions, films, food and football part of normal day-to-day
experience. There had not been a proper debate. The political aims of the EEC were not
considered at  all,  not even British entry into the European parliament,  which finally
happened  in  1979.  There  were  constant  grumbles  about  French  farmers,  Spanish
fishermen and Germans of all shades. Immigration was not an issue. There was not much
affection  on  display,  especially  within  the  Labour  Party  whose  1979  manifesto  was
opposed to  membership.  It  was  no union of  hearts.  British Euroscepticism remained
powerful and never went away. But it was also a colossal breakthrough, in terms of trade,
political associations and perhaps in national psychology. The Battle of Britain insularity
of  1940  vintage  had  gone.  At  last  Britain  had  found a  role,  which  seemingly  would
determine its future for the rest of time. 
32 Entry  into  the  European  Community  was  the  climax  of  a  relatively  trouble-free
experience for Britain in the wider world. Britain fought no wars (perhaps fortunately
since most of its troops were now used in strike-breaking or were stationed in Northern
Ireland).  Polaris  submarines  were renewed with Callaghan’s  Chevaline programme in
1979 but there was no prospect of their ever being used in anger. CND was subdued. The
prospect of military action against Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence in
Rhodesia, which would have been extraordinarily delicate against Britain’s ‘kith and kin’,
faded away. In 1979 one of Mrs. Thatcher’s first actions was to negotiate a settlement in
Rhodesia which was transformed into an independent country,  Zimbabwe,  under the
erstwhile Marxist president, Robert Mugabe. A potential crisis with Argentina over the
Falklands (the Malvinas to the Argentines) was skilfully negotiated away by Callaghan as
Foreign Secretary: he did at least keep a Royal navy vessel, the Endurance, in Falklands
waters flying the white ensign, whereas Mrs. Thatcher took one away and had to fight a
costly war in consequence.23 Callaghan also resisted American pressure to intervene over
Belize.  The British, tormented at home by manifold problems, buttressed overseas by
having joined Europe, freed from the remnants of empire, seemed content with a more
withdrawn post-colonial role. Foreign crises were occasionally to afflict the nation – Suez
in the fifties,  Iraq in the new century, under both Conservatives and Labour. But the
United Kingdom, whatever its domestic travails, rejoiced in its international position as a
land at peace.
33 This tranquil view is not a bad requiem on the stormy seventies. The land was tortured by
innumerable crises during that decade. Some like Northern Ireland dragged on for more
than two decades. But it had its elements of stability and progress. In the future, many
would hail Margaret Thatcher as the pilot who weathered the storms and restored order
and national self-confidence. In some ways she undoubtedly did so, though at grave social
cost. She also converted New Labour to many of her essential principles. But the decade
of Heath, Wilson and Callaghan, had its own successes, as an exercise in survival and, in
the case of Europe, brilliant vision. Perhaps the so-called dark ages when the lights went
out veiled a process of readjustment and renewal. Britain remained a land if not of glory
at least of hope. 
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34 Kenneth  Morgan est  universitaire  depuis  1958.  Il  est  auteur  d’une  vingtaine  de
monographies, notamment quatre biographies des figures politiques de premier plan :
David  Lloyd  George,  Keir  Hardie,  James  Callaghan  et  Michael  Foot,  et  de  fresques
ambitieuses  telles  que  A  People’s  Peace :  La  Grande-Bretagne  depuis  1945.  Soucieux  du
rayonnement de la recherche historique, il intervient régulièrement dans les différents
médias.
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ABSTRACTS
In popular recollection, the 1970s have gone down as the dark ages, Britain’s gloomiest period
since  the  second  world  war,  set  between  Harold  Wilson’s  ‘swinging  sixties’  and  Margaret
Thatcher’s divisive eighties. Forty years on, it is appropriate for the historian to examine how
valid  these  depressing  verdicts  on  the  United  Kingdom  really  were.  Were  the  dark  ages  an
exaggerated fabrication of excited journalists and ill-disposed foreigners? Or did the seventies
uncover something fundamentally wrong about this ancient people which survives to diminish
its authority and restrict its vision down to the present day? 
Dans la mémoire collective, les années 1970 constituent la période la plus sombre de l'histoire
contemporaine britannique depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, coincées entre les "swinging 60's
d'Harold Wilson et les années 1980 "clivantes" de Margaret Thatcher. Avec le recul de quatre
décennies il est temps pour l'historien de réévaluer le fondement de ces verdicts pessimistes. 
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